Commentary on Bhattacharya et al. (2018) : Reliance of the alcohol industry on heavy drinkers makes case against industry involvement in alcohol policy Bhattacharya and colleagues show that the alcohol industry is hugely reliant upon people drinking above guideline levels for revenue, highlighting the fundamental conflict of interest in allowing industry to self-regulate or be involved in health policymaking.
Bhattacharya and colleagues present the first study estimating the monetary value of drinking above guideline levels in England [1] with an innovative use and linkage of existing data. With a headline finding that the quarter of the adult population who drink above guideline levels consumes 78% of all the alcohol sold and generates 68% of the drinks industry's revenue [1] , this study provides a pithy account of just how reliant the alcohol industry is upon heavy drinking.
At first glance, it might seem obvious or tautological to read that the drinks industry profits from heavy drinkers. Indeed, some of the findings hint at the 80/20 rule (Pareto Principle), most notably that 81% of the alcohol industry's off-trade revenue (retailers, supermarkets, etc.) is generated by the 25% of the population drinking above guideline levels [1] . Importantly, however, this study quantifies precisely how much heavy drinking benefits the alcohol industry, by sector, and estimates how much revenue the industry would stand to lose if consumption were to fall to guideline levels. If consumption fell to within guideline levels overnight, the on-trade (restaurants, pubs, etc.) would lose a third of its revenue and the off-trade would lose almost half [1] .
As Bhattacharya and colleagues indicate, taken together these findings provide a strong case against the alcohol industry's involvement in policymaking and bring into question the appropriateness of industry self-regulation (e.g. the Portman Code). The alcohol industry is dominated by a small number of very large powerful companies. A recent paper in this journal has shown that the alcohol industry has extensive and strategic involvement in policymaking [2] . Voluntary initiatives such as the Public Health Responsibility Deal, which was in effect from 2010 to 2015, are favoured by the industry [3] but sadly do not have a good track record of reducing alcohol consumption [4] . Other policies where there is scientific evidence that alcohol consumption and harm will be reduced, such as minimum unit pricing [5] , have been opposed by the alcohol industry. All this indicates the problems this conflict of interest brings in involving the alcohol industry in policymaking in relation to health and alcohol harm.
Bhattacharya and colleagues provide some suggestions for future research, including a thought-provoking suggestion to explore government tax revenue from harmful drinking [1] , which could be compared against the health and social costs incurred due to alcohol, but perhaps their methods could be replicated to examine this conflict of interest in other compelling ways. As a thought experiment, could the alcohol industry revenue generated by underage drinkers be calculated for England? There may be methodological challenges in doing this; for example, purchasing data may be lacking for adolescents, but this would be a valuable extension of work elsewhere on revenue from adolescent drinking [6, 7] (cited in the present study) that could take account of prices paid by different population groups and types of drinker.
Another example would be to examine the alcohol industry's revenue from dependent drinkers or other vulnerable population groups. Again, there would be challenges-for example, dependent drinkers are known to be under-represented in general population survey data and are likely to under-report their consumption-but these kinds of study highlighting how the industry is reliant upon these particular groups would add persuasively to the evidence base around alcohol industry involvement in regulation and policymaking.
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